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Abstract 
Medicine and healthcare have been around for thousands of years, but we seldom ask why they are so important. It seems 
self-evident that we should seek relief of suffering from some institution in the society in which we live and equally self-
evident that each society should provide healthcare for its people at some level. Yet when we inquire further, we are driven 
to seek foundational answers to iterative questions, seeking answers at deeper and deeper levels. Ultimately, it seems best to 
accept the Humean refuge [1] and finish with some such statement as "Humans are like that" or "Societies can't function in 
any other way". 
These Humean questions suggest that survival, security and flourishing are endpoints for such an inquiry and that 
medical (and many other) systems are built on these implicit foundations. The ways in which societies build relevant 
systems (such as medicine, welfare, law, transport, housing and so on) will differ strikingly, but common ground will still 
exist at the foundational level. 
Acknowledging a commonality of foundations does not commit one either to a conservative normativity, nor to a loose 
relativism. Increasing activity at the level of the International Court of Justice makes clear that there is a possibility of 
consensus for judging the validity of the interpretations and enactments of foundational values in any society. The ideals of 
the American Declaration of Independence — life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness — are principles very similar to the 
foundational values of survival, security and flourishing. Person-centered medicine is inescapably based on theories of the 
person and must therefore be able to offer an account of what personhood is. Values underpin the philosophy and practice of 
medicine, including person-centered medicine, because they are foundations of personhood, as well as foundations of the 
societies in which each person lives. 
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Introduction 
For every bad-news piece run by the media, there will be a 
good-news piece, a break-through on cancer, a heroic 
operation to separate twins, a new diagnostic measure, a 
dedicated doctor and his team working in a poor country. 
Doctors can be portrayed as heroes [2], just as they can be 
dismissed as villains. And there are countless 
achievements they can point to in the management of 
cancer, coronary disease, tuberculosis, malaria, nutritional 
disorders — at least in developed nations. 
So it is possible to perceive both good and bad in 
modern medicine. Like most dichotomies, both extremes 
are wrong and neither is exclusive of the other. Modern 
medicine is both good and bad at the same time. Most 
people want technical competence at times of medical 
need. The charming doctor who gently presides over 
unnecessary deaths because of incompetence is condemned 
for incompetence, not praised for charm [3]. Knowledge, 
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competence, wisdom and self-control are goods in 
medicine; empathy, communicative skills and gentleness 
are also goods, but from different domains. The 'good 
doctor' is supposed to be, therefore, knowledgeable, 
skilled, wise, self-controlled, empathic, communicative 
and gentle. We would doubtless like to see all these 
qualities in lawyers, policemen, politicians, teachers, bus 
drivers and our own children. We seldom find such a 
happy combination of attributes. Humans are essentially 
human, fallible, subject to moods, fatigue and self-
protective instincts. To set the medical profession 
completely to rights would require a re-engineering of 
human nature. This is scarcely attainable, but if there are 
persistent perceptions of failure in some aspects of medical 
care, we should try to do something to address the real 
shortcomings. 
Let us accept that there are failings, that scientistic 
medicine can interfere with humane medical practice. Let 
us agree that there are some grounds for the complaints 
about poor communication, impersonal treatment, 
inefficient uses of therapeutic time and space, lack of 
social justice and so on. Or at least let us accept that these 
failings are legitimately perceived by those who complain. 
What can a reformer do? He can attack the problem at 
various levels. He can try to change societal expectations, a 
particularly thankless task. He can perhaps try to screen 
entrants to medical schools for empathy, motivation and 
moral sense — there is very little evidence that this has 
significant effect on the outlook and behaviour of 
graduates [4]. He can change the curriculum so that 
humane studies become important — this has been done in 
some places, but there is as yet no conclusive evidence to 
show that patients approve their graduates more than the 
graduates of other schools [5,6]. He can emphasise 
behavioural change in medical school and beyond, 
teaching a set of performative skills to medical trainees 
that may help patients to feel appreciated and respected —
the problem here is that performative skills work best in set 
scenarios and may seem hollow or offensive in real life; 
there is evidence that they may not always enhance patient 
satisfaction [7]. Or he may try to do what other reformers 
in recent years have tried, which is to re-set the base or re-
define the centre of medicine in order to remind 
practitioners, teachers and students of medicine's focal 
points. 
This redefinition of the heart of medicine has taken 
various forms and has been variably successful. Would-be 
reformers have suggested that medicine should be humane 
[8,9], evidence-based [10-22], values-based [23-29], 
narrative-based [6,30,31], person-centred [24,32-34] or 
that we should concentrate on the function of medicine, on 
its role of care, as patient-centred care [35-37], holistic 
care [38] or team-based care [35,39-41]. There are many 
other semantic labels that attempt to shift the relationships 
of medicine to its knowledge base, its power base and its 
constituency. Thus, we have toyed with construing patients 
as clients [42] or consumers [43-46], doctors as providers 
[40,41] and contractors [47]. These are laudable 
endeavours, but do not stop complaints or tensions, nor the 
growth of critical literature, both popular and scientific 
[48-52]. 
EBM is one alternative that has received rough 
handling in recent years [11,13,17-19,33,34,53-60], yet 
retains status and authority in the face of much legitimate 
criticism. In its early days, it promised much. David Eddy 
predicted that a computer on every doctor's desk would 
simplify and standardise decision-making in the clinical 
consultation and that evidence would at once indicate 
appropriate treatment for each and every patient [61]. A 
hierarchy of evidences came into being. The RCT became 
its sovereign, its 'gold standard', the meta-analysis its 
platinum emblem. Clinical experience and expert opinion 
became suspect and appeal to the logic of mechanism (it 
should work because...) was sidelined in favour of 
statistical evidence of epidemiological benefit. Admittedly, 
a host of critical arguments required that EBM should 
surrender some of its high ground. Clinical experience and 
expert opinion were allowed back in, down the hierarchy, 
but acknowledged as having some weight. 
We should never lose sight of the good that EBM has 
brought. It has undermined the false authority of 
fashionable eminence; it has persuaded clinicians to think 
about the nature of medical knowledge and the ways in 
which it is warranted; it has challenged teachers to think 
about medical decision-making and it has persuaded 
philosophers and sociologists of medicine to confront the 
challenges of positivism in delivering services essential to 
human welfare. 
The achievements of medicine in the last 100 years are 
very considerable. Most people are familiar with the 
statistics of life-expectancy, infant mortality, infectious 
diseases, that are the stuff of justification for the size and 
cost of the health enterprise. Sophisticated health services 
are differently available in different Western countries, but 
by comparison with 19 th  century services modern 
populations are reasonably well served. 
Yet despite the positives, there is a perception of 
failures, a perception that has remained steady for many 
years [62-65]. Authors may differ in their accounts of the 
shortcomings of healthcare, but there are some common 
concerns. Medicine is impersonal; it is scientistic at the 
expense of being humane; its communication skills are 
inadequate; it is inefficient with its time; its practitioners 
are arrogant and too preoccupied with status and income; it 
is potentially corrupt and sometimes practices scientific 
fraud; it has sinister ties to pharmaceutical industries and 
technology companies; it attends too much to remunerative 
practice and too little to welfare and the illnesses of those 
in most need. In short, it has too much concern for its own 
welfare and too little social conscience, too scant a 
relationship to the humanity of those in need of care. 
There is a fundamental difficulty for anyone who 
wants to change the habits of many lifetimes. Medicine has 
grown organically to meet needs and to incorporate and 
exploit an expanding science. Its roots can be traced back 
thousands of years and it has become a part of the fabric of 
any society. Medicine is pushed by the vires a tergo of 
tradition and habit and pulled by the vires a fronte of 
scientific technology and social aspiration. People expect 
some kind of medical services, wherever they are and they 
expect sophisticated services in Western societies, where 
technology flourishes the most. Patients and doctors are 
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people, shaped by cultures and individual differences. 
Students graduate from medical schools and move into the 
established cultures of hospitals and clinical practices. 
They may retain memories of the good things they were 
taught, but enculturation into the pragmatism of the clinic 
is a powerful shaping force. It changes the habitus of the 
evolving doctor, the distinctive combination of the 
individual attributes and acquisitions that constitute the 
individual at any time [66]. And its moulding force is as 
much implicit as explicit. Models of success, of survival, 
of comportment and behaviour, surround the neophyte as 
he or she passes further into the distorted world of the 
clinic, where the abnormal is normal and suffering is the 
stock in trade of its workers. 
Part of the indignation about the power of the EBM 
movement seems to result from a wide realisation of 
incoherence and an objection to the word 'based'. 
Evidence may be a basis for medical practice, but not for 
medicine itself. While its influence lingers, interviews 
show that practising doctors in Sydney are respectful but 
reserved, recognising the importance of context and 
individual differences — their own included [67,68]. In a 
series of interviews with doctors associated with the 
Sydney Medical School in Australia, we encountered many 
variations of this theme. Here are 2 examples: 
There are circumstances where that is a clear and 
substantial benefit for a treatment and I think it's not so 
difficult to discuss what to do. But I think a lot of the time 
the evidence is not so overwhelming or the benefits are 
small and there are minuses as well as the pluses and so the 
more finely balanced that decision, the greater the extent of 
the person's, kind of, philosophy and attitudes and things. 
The encounter between a patient and a clinician is basically 
an encounter between 2 human beings and therefore it's 
primarily an issue of relationships and communication. 
There is the technical stuff which needs to clearly be fed 
into that and there may be things that we learn from 
research which can help clinicians know how to manage 
the relationship, but I mean essentially we are left with 2 
people talking to each other and a large part of that is may 
be informed by the research, but it essentially is the art of 
being people, communicating and talking. 
The second doctor is describing a version of person-
centred medicine (PCM), in which a clinician and a patient 
encounter one another as persons. Most of the 19 doctors 
we interviewed made very similar observations. This is 
how clinicians encounter their daily praxis and how they 
deal with moral quandaries and dilemmas. This repeated 
emergence of person-centeredness has led Miles and 
Mezzich [34] to support Upshur's contention [59] that 
medicine needs no foundation, because it 'can operate well 
within a dynamic emergent framework' [34]. And it leads 
them to the same conclusion about patient-centered 
medicine. 
But is it reasonable to leave PCM as emergent, without 
the need for a base? We think not, because we believe that 
there are deeper justifications for medicine than medicine 
itself and for that reason propose values-based medicine 
(VBM) as an underpinning for PCM, using 2 
epistemological manoeuvres, one old and one new. The  
newer one takes a 'Humean-Darwinian' approach to ethics 
[69,70]; the older adopts the Humean standpoint of 
repetitive questioning in order to find a foundational 
proposition beyond which it seems impossible or pointless 
to go [1]. 
The Humean-Darwinian approach to ethics is 
avowedly naturalistic. Hume insisted that moral values 
emerge from human desires or 'passions', modulated by 
`reason'. Passions determine what we want to achieve; 
reason tells us how best to gain our desires and needs. The 
Darwinian component suggests that rational, social beings 
like humans will select ways of interacting that facilitate 
individual and group flourishing and that evolution will 
select forms of ethics that enhance survival capacity. When 
Hume and Darwin are brought together, as they are by 
Curry [70], the is-ought distinction and various forms of 
the naturalistic fallacy lose much of their force. To quote 
Curry: 
Recent developments in game theory, evolutionary 
biology, animal behaviour and neuroscience suggest that 
Hume was right to think that humans have natural 
dispositions to act 'in the common good'. Evolutionary 
theory leads us to expect that organisms will be social, 
cooperative and even altruistic under certain circumstances. 
What is happening in a functioning democratic society 
is indeed 'good' insofar as it permits evolution to continue 
and the common weal to prosper. But this does not mean 
that everything is for the best in this best of all possible 
worlds, nor does it mean that every society is serving 
human welfare to the optimum extent. The world is full of 
power blocs, whose elites exploit the weakest within their 
domains. Any society has its black spots of injustice, 
violence, corruption and exploitation. But established 
societies, with all their faults, offer some measure of 
stability to their members and presumably the practices, 
morals, beliefs and habits serve the ends of promoting 
some values that are held at a very deep level and which 
may be consistent between cultures. 
Hume also gives us a hint about the way to search for 
those values. He suggests an iterative process of inquiry 
that seeks reasons for practices and beliefs, to the point 
where further search becomes pointless. He offers this 
example: 
Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer, because 
he desires to keep his health. If you then enquire, why he 
desires health, he will readily reply, because sickness is 
painful. If you push your enquiries further, and desire 
reason why he hates pain, it is impossible that he can ever 
give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to 
any other object...And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask 
for a reason. It is impossible that there can be a progress in 
infinitum and that one thing can always be a reason why 
another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own 
account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement 
with human sentiment and affection [1]. 
We think it is productive to follow Hume's method of 
iterative inquiry in a search for foundational values and 
then to consider how such values may play out in practice. 
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But we need first to explain further what we mean by 
values. 
Values and axiology 
Values, as we understand them, are the foundations on 
which we base our qualitative judgements of 'good' or 
`bad' in ethics, 'beautiful' or 'ugly' in aesthetics. Values 
underpin our beliefs and commitments at deep levels of our 
minds and brains. They reflect our deepest needs and at 
this profound level, foundational values are common to all 
cultures and all times. This sounds like a highly 
contentious claim, but we believe that disagreement comes 
from a confusion in the discourse of axiology between the 
foundational values and their enactments in different 
cultures, different contexts and at different times. We tend 
to identify the choices and decisions people make as their 
values, instead of reflections of their values and thus to 
think that people and peoples have different values when 
their underlying commitments may be remarkably similar. 
Let us try to explain what we mean, by repeatedly 
asking questions in the Humean fashion, about medicine as 
a public service. Why do we spend so much money and 
political activity on health services? Perhaps because 
people have come to expect that good government in a 
good society will provide adequate health services. But 
what do adequate health services actually do? They 
provide care and relief for people suffering illness. But 
why should society bother to do this? And somewhere 
along this line of questioning one is forced to say 
something like 'Because there is no other way that a 
society can function" or "Because that is the way that 
human nature works." These may be unsatisfactory 
answers in some ways, but, as Hume suggests, 'Something 
must be desirable on its own account and because of its 
immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and 
affection.' We believe, furthermore, that one can follow 
this process with almost any institution in society — law, 
education, housing, transport, business and so on. 
The Humean iteration leads us to 3 basic values that 
seem common to all individuals and to a very high 
proportion of the world's cultures. First, we value survival. 
When confronted with drowning, we struggle to breathe 
again; when starving, we improvise to find food and water 
somehow; when freezing, we struggle to keep warm. 
Second, when we have the means to survive, we value 
ontological security, the predictability that protects our 
daily excursions and activities. We expect that other people 
on the street and in the workplace will not assault or try to 
kill us, that cars will respect pedestrian crossings and red 
lights, that building safety codes have been respected and 
so on. Third, we value the ability to transcend our daily 
lives, to enjoy sensory intellectual and spiritual 
experiences from the security that our society provides, to 
exercise the freedom to flourish. Survival, security and 
flourishing lie at the heart of our value systems and they 
are enacted socially in different ways in different cultures. 
The United States, France, Britain, Iran and China have 
different justice systems, for example, but each of them  
serve to provide security by defining crimes and 
prescribing laws, processes and punishments that are 
codified and enacted in known ways. Societies may 
function with very different enactments, so long as they 
can secure the primal values attached to survival and 
security. In addition to safety, people seek freedom to 
pursue flourishing. Societies that work to guarantee 
survival, security and flourishing for all members represent 
the highest in human achievement. This is underscored and 
empirically supported by democratic peace theory [71], 
since the absence of war is one of the best guarantees of 
safety, security and flourishing 
This position tolerates many different kinds of 
culturally specific practices, but it is not necessarily 
weakly relativist. Chinese society, rooted in Confucianism, 
values self-restraint and collective wellbeing; the US 
Declaration of Independence talks of the central 
importance of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" 
and a 'good' society should offer all these. The increasing 
activity and standing of the International Court of Justice 
suggests that there are widely shared views of what 
constitutes breaches of acceptable protection of the 
foundational values. 
This is the position of modest foundationalism that we 
adopt and we do not see it as harmful, reductive or 
restrictive [72]. It is descriptive and aetiological and not 
normative. We believe that it helps to answer the 
fundamental question "Why have healthcare?" It 
encourages cross-cultural inquiry and understanding and 
helps us to appreciate the profound responses that societies 
generate when there are threats to health services or when 
health services demonstrate major failings. We have to 
disagree respectfully with Miles and Mezzich [72] when 
they criticise other models of medicine than person-
centered medicine by insisting that "These  models, 
however, despite their noble aspirations aimed at 
philosophical resolution, remain problematic in claiming 
for medicine largely singular visions predicated upon 
the specific viewpoints of individual schools of 
thought." VBM, in our particular model, does no more 
than provide a further logical basis for person-centered 
medicine by reminding us that the survival, security and 
flourishing that we speak about are all potential attributes 
of persons within the 'medical' context. It will not do to 
claim that person-centered medicine is based on theories of 
the person, but exclude some of the foundational features 
of personhood from the theory. 
Values-based medicine has been suggested as a 
complement to EBM, but the most influential account of 
VBM differs somewhat from ours. Fulford has written 
extensively on the topic, basing his account of VBM on 
teaching students to elicit and respect patient preferences 
[23,24,28,73]. Preferences thus become proxies for values, 
a position that we respect, but do not follow. We believe 
that this model leads people to detect differences in values 
where they do not exist. Preferences are context-
determined expressions of values. Values can be 
conceptualised as foundational needs, common to people 
in virtue of their personhood. Nearly everyone wants to 
survive, be secure and flourish, but cultures, societies and 
individuals have different approaches to meeting those 
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needs. Our model, therefore, provides a starting point for 
wide discourse, Fulford's a means to teach practices and 
skills. We endorse his program whole-heartedly, because 
we believe that the models are complementary. 
Fulford outlines 10 principles of values-based 
medicine [73]: 
1. All decisions stand on 2 feet, on values as well as on 
facts, including decisions about diagnosis (The "2-
feet" principle). 
2. We tend to notice values only when they are diverse or 
conflicting and hence are likely to be problematic (The 
"squeaky wheel" principle). 
3. Scientific progress, in opening up choices, is 
increasingly bringing the full diversity of human 
values into play in all areas of healthcare (The 
`science driven" principle). 
4. VBM's first call for information is the perspective of 
the patient or patient group concerned in a given 
decision (The "patient perspective" principle). 
5. In VBM, conflicts of values are resolved primarily, 
not by reference to a rule prescribing a "right" 
outcome, but by processes designed to support a 
balance of legitimately different perspectives (The 
"muti-perspective" principle). 
6. Careful attention to language use in a given context is 
one of a range of powerful methods for raising 
awareness of values (The "values blindness" 
principle). 
7. A rich resource of both empirical and philosophical 
methods is available for improving our knowledge of 
other people's values (The "values-myopia" 
principle). 
8. Ethical reasoning is employed in VBM primarily to 
explore differences of values, rather than, as in quasi-
legal bioethics, to determine "what is right" (The 
"space of values" principle). 
9. In VBM, communication skills have a substantive 
rather than (as in quasi-legal ethics) a merely 
executive role in decision-making (The "how it's 
done" principle). 
10. VBM, although involving a partnership with ethicists 
and lawyers (equivalent to the partnership with 
scientists and statisticians in EBM), puts decision-
making back where it belongs, with users and 
providers at the clinical coal-face (The "who 
decides?" principle). 
These principles bring together suggestions from many 
fields of bioethics, philosophical ethics and communication 
theory. Fulford is frank about their particular application to 
psychiatry [73], but common sense allows their relevance 
to clinical practice in general. The strength of Fulford's 
approach lies in its fitness for teaching, the ways in which 
the 10 principles can be specifically taught to medical 
students at all stages. 
Practical applications 
We quote at length from a previous article in order to 
summarise what we feel to be the essential message of this 
paper [27]: 
So how does this play out in medicine? First, as discussed 
above, our model provides us with a way of understanding 
why we have health systems at all - all health systems in all 
cultures are expressions of the desire for safety, security 
and flourishing. We have health systems to save life, to 
preserve or restore function in the face of trauma or 
disease, to provide access to skills for those with health 
needs. And these things matter because people want to go 
on living without suffering, want to realise or extend their 
capabilities, want help when illness threatens or reduces 
their quality or quantity of life. In this way, values-based 
medicine provides us with an abductively-derived 'base' 
for medicine that other systems, such as evidence-based 
medicine, simply cannot provide. 
Second, our model can help us to understand why 
particular health systems have evolved in particular ways 
and why health systems might differ in different settings. 
Take, for example, the differences between the health 
system in the US and the health system in the UK. In one, a 
heavily socialised system makes good to modest services 
available for all. In the other, the world's most 
sophisticated services are available for some, basic services 
for others. In parts of Africa, there may be very basic 
services for some, no western-style services for others. Yet 
in each country, there are organisations and groups that 
seek to preserve lives, to relieve suffering and to return 
people to their capabilities. The priorities differ 
considerably between rich and poor countries, between rich 
and poor people. The Texas Heart Center has a quite 
different philosophy to Medicine sans Frontieres. One is a 
business that depends on capitalistic theories of enterprise, 
selling survival, security and flourishing at superb level and 
high price; the other a charitable enterprise that tries to 
deliver survival, security and the capability to flourish to 
some of the most vulnerable people in the world, without 
profit. Both owe their continuing existence to individual 
and cultural values, however differently they may be 
expressed in different socio-economic contexts. Their 
translation into action in different ways has produced the 
societies and cultures we know. Other foundations might 
have produced better ones, but that is to enter the domain 
of speculative ethics, to recross the naturalistic barrier into 
a realm of thought experiment. 
This kind of modest foundationalism thus develops into 
a form of values-based medicine (VBM) with broad 
implications, where the word 'based' is used deliberately to 
recognise that all healthcare is justified by 'basic' values. It 
allows the incorporation of EBM, narrative-based 
medicine, patient-centered care and person-centered 
medicine, but also sits comfortably with public health 
(including its ethics). It respects cultural differences, 
preferences and ethonomics, the increasingly important 
intersection between ethics and economics [74,75]. But it 
always demands reflective equilibrium. By recognising 
their deep, implicit presence we offer practitioners and 
students a direction for the exercise of wide reflective 
equilibrium, the process whereby formative experience, 
moral theory, moral reasoning and moral knowledge are 
brought to bear on an ethical quandary [76-78]. 
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This leads to the third use of our model. By 
understanding why particular health systems have evolved 
as they have, we have the basis for a critique of these 
systems at all levels, to include its patients, bureaucrats, 
healthcare workers, researchers and so on. Our capacity to 
understand (and empathise) provides us with one 
component of the wide reflective equilibrium according to 
which we can judge our own healthcare practices and those 
of others. 
Conclusion 
Values, in this paper, are conceived as the implicit, often 
remote, justifications for our beliefs and choices. Beliefs 
and choices are the enactments of values, rather than the 
values themselves. Our own previous empirical research 
leads us to agree with the words of the Founding Fathers in 
the American Declaration of Independence. We value life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness - in other words, we 
look to our society and its culture to provide us singly and 
collectively with means of survival, institutions to insure 
our security and opportunities and freedoms for human 
flourishing. Once again, we take the liberty of quoting 
from previous work [27]: 
VBM, couched in these terms, provides no cut-and-dried 
answers to the perennial problems of bioethics. What it 
might do, however, is provide a conceptual framework and 
a heuristic for understanding, reflection, discourse and 
dialectic when there appear to be irreconcilable differences 
between practices and beliefs, between possibilities and 
realities. VBM incorporates EBM, patient-centered care, 
public health, bench-top research and person-centered 
medicine. It has some claims to be the basis for medical 
education at all levels, for establishing standards of practice 
and for reflection on ethical quandaries at individual and 
population levels. In no way does it compete with person-
centered medicine for rhetorical priority, but it may offer a 
further justification for value-laden theorising in medical 
epistemology and practice. Some may even prefer to use 
the concept in the dialectic of revision between the 
`scientistic' and the 'humanistic' extremes of healthcare 
theory. 
We believe that our 'modest' and aetiological 
foundationalism serves to strengthen Fulford's model by 
providing justifications for taking the trouble to enact his 
principles in clinical practice. It defends respect for 
preferences, but asks the student, the researcher and the 
practitioner to enter into the social and psychological 
processes whereby the individual arrives at different 
preferences from similar starting points to her own. It helps 
the processes of empathy and sympathy by recognising the 
common features of humanity and personhood. 
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